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ABSTRACT
Since 1800 life expectancy at birth has doubled from about 40 years to nearly 80
years in high-income countries. Pessimists expect these improvements to end soon
because we are approaching biological limits to longevity, whereas optimists predict
continued rapid improvements without limits. To shed light on this controversy, past
trends in the juvenile, background, and senescent components of life expectancy are
examined in 16 high-income countries. Large increases in conventional life expectancy
before 1950 are found to be primarily attributable to reductions in juvenile and
background mortality. After 1950 the rate of improvement in life expectancy slowed
because declines in juvenile and background mortality slowed, but senescent mortality
fell more rapidly than before, thus becoming the main cause of rising life expectancy at
birth. The role of smoking in the past half-century is also quantified. In the future,
background mortality and juvenile mortality will have little or no impact on longevity
because they have reached very low levels. There is, however, no evidence of
approaching limits and life expectancy will likely improve at a rate of approximately 1.5
years per decade owing to continued declines in senescent mortality.

One of the most notable achievements of modern societies is a large rise in human
longevity. Since 1800 life expectancy at birth has doubled from about 40 years to nearly
80 years. Recent mortality trends are well established, but there is considerable
disagreement among demographers and biologists about what lies ahead. Pessimists
believe we are approaching limits to life expectancy, while optimists expect continued
rapid improvements with no limits. Much is at stake: improvements in longevity are a
key cause of skyrocketing costs of pensions and healthcare for the elderly.
After a brief review of the controversy about future trends, this study examines
past trends in the components of life expectancy at birth. The projection of these
components provides the basis for assessing plausible future trends in longevity. The
focus throughout is on high-income countries with low levels of mortality.
FROM PESSIMISM TO OPTIMISM
Reliable historical estimates of mortality are available for a small number of
countries. Figure 1a plots past estimates of life expectancy at birth for females in 16 highincome countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland,
France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United States (Human Mortality Database 2005).1 The longest plotted time series
start in 1850 and end in 2000 and the shortest are from 1950 to 2000. Trends for male life
expectancy at birth in Figure 1b are broadly similar, although males live, on average, a
few years less than females. All 16 countries experienced large increases in life
expectancy. The only significant interruptions in this overall upward trend are attributable
to the global influenza epidemic in 1918–19 and two World Wars. Differences between
these countries have narrowed considerably over time, leaving most countries today with
life expectancies close to the average for the group, regardless of historical patterns. In
recent decades, countries have moved in tandem within a narrow range to reach an
average in 2000 of 81.5 years for females and 75.8 years for males. This remarkable
convergence is presumably due to a reduction in disparities among countries in standards
of living, nutrition, and public health measures and increasingly rapid diffusion of
advances in medical treatment, drug therapy, and life style among countries (Riley 2001).
Other notable features evident in Figure 1 are the less rapid pace of improvement in
female life expectancy in recent decades than in the century before the 1950s and the stall
in male life expectancy in the 1950s and 1960s. The future implications of these recent
trends are the subject of a contentious debate.
Pessimists believe that future life expectancy has an upper limit of about 85 years
and they provide biological and demographic evidence in support of this view (Fries
1980; Olshansky, Carnes, and Cassel 1990). The biological argument considers mortality
after the reproductive ages to lie beyond the reach of Darwinian forces of natural
selection. As a result, an “intrinsic” biologically determined age pattern of senescent
mortality is said to exist, which rises steeply with age after about age 30 in humans. This
pattern is “expected to remain invariant unless the genome itself is modified” (Carnes,
Olshansky, and Grahn 1996: 252). The pessimists’ demographic argument claims that
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improvements in life expectancy at birth can only result from declines in “premature”
mortality among children and young adults. In contrast, senescent mortality at older ages
is considered largely immutable, because at the end of the natural life span “everything
comes apart at once and repair is impossible” (Fries 1980: 135).
Up to the 1980s this pessimistic perspective was accepted by many demographers.
For example, Bourgeois-Pichat (1978) proposed “biological” limits for life expectancy of
80.3 years for females and 73.8 years for males. Population projections prepared by the
United Nations at various times from the 1950s to the 1980s included a maximum. This
pessimism led to the consistent underestimation of future improvements in longevity in
projections made before the 1990s (Keilman 1997).
Several developments during the 1990s led to the demise of this pessimism. First,
most proposed past limits to life expectancy were exceeded, often soon after they were
introduced (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002). This continuous need for an upward revision of
supposedly fixed limits is evident in the past record of United Nations projections, which
raised their maximum life expectancy several times before the mid-1980s. The more
recent UN projections have abandoned the practice of imposing limits. Second, agespecific death rates at the oldest ages show no evidence of leveling off. On the contrary,
these rates exhibit steady declines (Lee and Carter 1992; Kannisto et al. 1994). Third, the
pace of improvement in old-age mortality shows no relationship to the level of old-age
mortality (Wilmoth 1997). If limits exist, one would expect countries close to the limit to
experience smaller and slower improvements than countries that are farther from the
limit. Finally, the claim that mortality at the oldest ages is not subject to the forces of
natural selection is being questioned (Lee 2003). Moreover, it is doubtful whether a
biological argument can contribute insight into the potential future impact of medical
interventions, even if it explains the exponential rise with age in post-reproductive-age
mortality.
In their recent writings, the pessimists seem to have made a concession. Instead of
being immutable, the limits to life span are now referred to as “a mortality schedule that,
in the absence of medical interventions, cannot further be reduced” (Olshansky, Carnes,
and Brody 2002: 505; italics added). Any such improvements “manufacture survival time
by saving the lives of people who would otherwise die” (ibid.). This language represents
a significant change in position, or at least in the position as interpreted by many readers
of the earlier work of Olshansky and his colleagues. It is quite possible, indeed likely,
that most improvements in mortality at older ages in the future will be “manufactured”
through medical interventions, but if that is the case the net result will still be a life
expectancy beyond the proposed limits of about 85 years. As noted by Wilmoth (2001),
the difference of opinion between Olshansky and Carnes and other demographers about
likely future trends in life expectancy now appears to be smaller than is widely presumed.
A recent panel report of the National Research Council concludes that if any
limits exist, they are far above current levels, and that projections therefore should not
impose ceilings (National Research Council 2000). This view is now widely held in the
demographic community, and the focus of debate has shifted from the limits to life
expectancy to the size of future increases in life expectancy. There is, however, no
4

agreement about most plausible future trends. Optimists such as Fogel and Costa (1997)
document long-range improvements in human physiology (e.g., body size; durability of
vital organ systems) as a result of increased human control of the environment, and they
expect continued rapid improvements in longevity during the twenty-first century.
Manton, Stallard, and Tolley (1991) also anticipate much higher levels of life expectancy
in the future owing to the development of interventions to address chronic diseases at
advanced ages. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) observe that best-practice life expectancy has
increased by 2.5 years per decade for the past century and a half, and they conclude that a
“reasonable scenario” would be for this trend to continue. This view is not shared by
most national and international agencies that are responsible for preparing official
country projections. Their projections are considerably more conservative even if they do
not impose limits. For example, United Nations projections for the next half century
made in 2004 (without a life span limit) expect female life expectancy in the United
States to increase at a rate of 1.1 years per decade (United Nations 2005). Similarly, the
US Social Security Administration assumes a rise in life expectancy of only 0.8 years per
decade over the same period (Board of Trustees OASDI 2005). These projected rates of
future improvement are less than half the rate considered reasonable by Oeppen and
Vaupel (2002). The question of what lies ahead remains unsettled.
COMPONENTS OF LIFE EXPECTANCY LEVELS AND TRENDS
Before discussing the future prospects for life expectancy it is necessary to
interpret past trends. For this purpose I propose a procedure for decomposing life
expectancy. This decomposition divides the level of life expectancy at a given point in
time into three components, which quantify the roles of juvenile, background, and
senescent mortality.
—Juvenile mortality. Past increases in life expectancy at birth (denoted LE) are in
part due to declines in mortality at the youngest ages. For present purposes all mortality
under age 25 will be considered “juvenile”.2 To quantify the role of juvenile mortality, I
calculate a variant of the conventional life expectancy at birth. This variant, called “life
expectancy without juvenile mortality” (denoted LEJ), equals the average age at death for
a newborn as calculated with a mortality life table in which all newborns are assumed to
survive to age 25. In more conventional demographic terminology LEJ equals life
expectancy at age 25 plus 25. It is a measure of adult mortality over age 25.
—Background mortality. Past studies of age patterns of adult mortality have often
distinguished between background and senescent mortality (Carnes, Olshansky, and
Grahn 1996; Gavrilov and Gavrilova 1991; Horiuchi and Wilmoth 1998; Makeham
1860). The distinction between these two components of adult mortality is useful for
describing age patterns of death rates, and models using it provide an extremely good fit
to empirical data (Bongaarts 2005; Thatcher 1999). The risks of some causes of death
(e.g., cardiovascular disease and cancer) rise strongly with age and therefore are
considered part of senescent mortality. Other causes of death do not show a strong age
pattern (e.g., accidents, violence, and some infectious diseases) and they are considered
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part of background mortality, which is assumed to be age invariant in the models. A
complete mapping of causes of death to the background and senescent components is
difficult and is not attempted here. Instead, background mortality is estimated with an
empirical method proposed by Bongaarts (2005) and summarized in the Appendix. As
shown next, this estimate permits the calculation of the contribution of background
mortality to levels and trends in life expectancy.
—Senescent mortality. Senescent mortality rises rapidly with age owing to the
deterioration of physiological processes at the cellular and systemic levels. Estimates of
senescent mortality by age are obtained by subtracting background mortality from the
observed total death rate at each age. To summarize the resulting age pattern of senescent
mortality, I introduce a third longevity measure called “senescent life expectancy.”
Senescent life expectancy (denoted LES) is defined as the mean age at death for a
newborn, on the assumption that all newborns survive to age 25 and are not subject to
background mortality. That is, LES equals the life expectancy obtained with a
conventional life table in which senescent mortality is the only cause of death.
Once estimates of these three longevity measures—LE, LEJ, and LES—are
available, the roles of juvenile and background mortality are readily calculated. The
effect of juvenile mortality on life expectancy (denoted J) is estimated as the difference
between LEJ and LE :
J = LEJ – LE
and the role of background mortality is quantified as the difference between senescent
life expectancy and life expectancy without juvenile mortality:
B = LES – LEJ
These measures lead to a simple equation for decomposing life expectancy:
LE = LES – B – J
The conventional life expectancy at any point in time equals senescent life expectancy
minus the longevity-reducing effects of background and juvenile mortality.
This equation for the components of the level of life expectancy yields a similar
decomposition for the change or trend in life expectancy at birth between two successive
points in time. The change in life expectancy at birth ( LE) equals the rise in senescent
life expectancy ( LES) plus the background mortality effect ( B) plus the juvenile
mortality effect ( J):
LE= LES + B+ J
In this decomposition model, changes in the components between times t1 and t2 are
estimated as LE=LE(t2)-LE(t1), LES=LES(t2)-LES(t1), B=B(t1)-B(t2) and J=J(t1)-J(t2).

6

DECOMPOSITION RESULTS: 1850–2000
The longevity measures LE, LEJ, and LES were calculated for each of the 16
countries for all available years, separately for females and males. Only a partial
summary of the voluminous results can be provided here. The focus is on average trends
for females in the five countries with records from 1850 to 2000: Denmark, England and
Wales, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Results for males are included in the figures
but are not discussed in detail.
Figure 2a plots average estimates for females for this subset of five countries from
1850 to 2000, and Table 1 presents results for selected years. Over this period the
following changes occurred:
—Life expectancy (LE) increased from 45.7 years to 80.7 years (+35)
—Life expectancy without juvenile mortality (LEJ ) increased from 63.9 years to
81.4 years (+17.5)
—Senescent life expectancy (LES ) increased from 72.3 years to 81.7 years (+9.4)
In 1850 senescent life expectancy exceeded life expectancy at birth by 26.6 years (72.3
vs. 45.7), but by 2000 the difference had narrowed to just 1 year (81.7 vs. 80.7). The
cause of this convergence is a large secular decline of juvenile and background mortality
to very low levels. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the effect of juvenile mortality declined
from 18.2 years to 0.6 years (–17.5), and the background mortality effect declined from
8.4 years to just 0.3 years (–8.1).
Life expectancy at birth rose by 35 years between 1850 and 2000. This change
can be expressed as the sum of the effects of changes in senescent life expectancy ( LES
= 9.4 years), background mortality ( B = 8.1 years), and juvenile mortality ( J =17.5
years): 35 = 9.4 + 8.1 + 17.5. These effects changed considerably over time. Figure 5
presents a decomposition of trends for the periods 1850–1900, 1900–1950, and 1950–
2000. Life expectancy at birth rose more rapidly between 1900 and 1950 (+20.1 years)
than in the period 1850–1900 (+6.4 years) or 1950–2000 (+8.5 years). The large increase
in conventional life expectancy before 1950 was primarily attributable to reductions in
juvenile and background mortality. After 1950 the rate of improvement in life expectancy
slowed because improvements in juvenile and background mortality slowed, but the pace
of increase in senescent life expectancy rose. Between 1950 and 2000, the rise in female
senescent life expectancy of 5.6 years became the dominant cause of the rise in life
expectancy of 8.5 years.
A plausible explanation for the recent acceleration of the improvement in
senescent life expectancy is that medical treatment became more effective around the
middle of the twentieth century with the widespread use of antibiotics and the ability to
treat cardiovascular and other chronic diseases (Costa 2005; Crimmins 1981; Riley
2001). Apparently, the factors that brought about massive declines in juvenile and
background mortality before 1950 (i.e., improvements in standards of living and
nutrition, and the introduction of public health measures) had little impact on senescent
mortality.
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GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SENESCENT LIFE EXPECTANCY AND THE ROLE OF SMOKING:
1950–2000
Aside from the well-established fact that longevity is slightly shorter for males
than for females, the long-range trend in senescent life expectancy for males is broadly
similar to that for females. As was the case for females, male LES increased little before
1950 but accelerated in recent decades (see Figure 2 and Table 1). The main difference
between sexes is that male LES stagnated during the 1950s and 1960s while improvement
continued for females. This finding requires a brief exploration because it has
implications for the projection of life expectancy by sex.
Smoking behavior provides a plausible partial explanation for the stalling of male
life expectancy and the divergence of trends in male and female life expectancy in the
1950s and 1960s (Gjonca et al. 2005; Pampel 2002; Peto et al. 1994; Valkonen and von
Poppel 1997). Cigarette smoking rose substantially in the first half of the twentieth
century, and the resulting excess mortality was observed after a delay of a few decades.
Figure 6 plots the proportion of all deaths attributed to smoking by sex for the developed
world (Peto et al. 2005). This proportion is much higher for males than for females,
reflecting the earlier adoption and higher prevalence of smoking among males. The
smoking impact among males peaked in 1990 at 25 percent of all deaths. The subsequent
decline is the delayed mortality response to the decline in smoking among males that
followed the confirmation in the 1960s of the link between smoking and lung cancer. In
contrast, the female proportion of deaths due to smoking rises steadily. As a result,
smoking appears to be the main reason for the widening of sex differentials in mortality
in the middle of the twentieth century and for the subsequent narrowing of this
differential in recent years (Gjonca et al. 2005; Pampel 2002).
The impact of smoking on life expectancy can be estimated by using the age- and
sex-specific proportion of deaths attributed to smoking from Peto et al. (2005). The
removal of smoking mortality from the life table calculations results in a variant of
senescent life expectancy that I call “senescent life expectancy without smoking” and
denote LENS (see Appendix for details). The difference between senescent life expectancy
with and without smoking equals the smoking effect, S:
S= LENS – LES
Figure 7 and Table 2 present average values of LENS and LES and the smoking effects for
all 16 countries used in this study for males and females. The smoking effect varies over
time and differs between sexes. For males it averages 1.1 years in 1950, rises to a peak of
3.0 years in 1980 and 1985, and declines slightly to 2.4 years in 2000. For females the
effect is very small in 1950 but rises steadily to 1.0 year by 2000. Without the smoking
effect males still have lower life expectancy than females but the difference has narrowed
at every point in time. Country-specific estimates of LENS and S in 1950 and 2000 are
presented in Table 3. These results are not discussed here but Peto et al. (2005) review
smoking mortality levels and trends in developed countries.
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The removal of the smoking effect changes the trend in average senescent life
expectancy between 1950 and 2000. Without smoking, LENS rises by an average of 6.9
years for males (from 73.3 to 80.2 years) and by a slightly higher amount, 8.2 years, for
females (from 75.6 to 83.8 years). These increases are larger than those that occur with
smoking (LES) for females (8.2 instead of 7.2 years) and in particular for males (6.9
instead of 5.6 years). The trend in male senescent life expectancy without smoking is
more linear than with smoking, and it is broadly similar to that for females. The stall in
the 1950s and 1960s in male LES has disappeared.
Figure 8 compares male and female senescent life expectancy without smoking
for each of the 16 high-income countries from 1950 to 2000. In contrast to trends in life
expectancy, these trends are roughly linear for both sexes. Differences among countries
are remarkably small: the standard deviation for both males and females is just 1.0 year in
2000. The steady pace of increase and the similarity of trends for males and females
make this longevity indicator more suitable than conventional life expectancy for making
projections.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE LIFE EXPECTANCY
Existing methods for projecting future life expectancy rely wholly or in part on
extrapolation of past trends in mortality rates, longevity measures, or parameters in
mortality models (Keyfitz 1991; Lee 1998; Pollard 1987; Tabeau, Jeths, and Heathcote
2001). This general approach is also used in a new method for projecting life expectancy
proposed below. Based on the preceding analysis of the components of life expectancy,
this method considers senescent life expectancy without smoking, LENS, to be the main
driver of future life expectancy at birth, and considers the effects of background, juvenile,
and smoking mortality to be secondary factors. This approach is proposed for highincome countries with low mortality because background and juvenile have reached such
low levels that any further changes in them will have little impact on future life
expectancy. As a result, nearly all future improvement in life expectancy at birth will
have to come from improvements in senescent longevity. In addition, the smoking effect
should be taken into account to ensure more reliable forecasts, because the rise in
smoking mortality in recent decades has obscured the underlying trends in improvements
in senescent mortality.
The preparation of a projection of life expectancy at birth based on past trends in
LENS involves several steps.3
1) Calculation of past trends in LENS for a period of at least several decades using
the methods described above. Estimates can be made separately for females and males or
for the male and female population combined. This step is illustrated in Table 3, which
gives estimates of LENS in 1950 and 2000 for 16 countries.
2) Extrapolation of LENS for the desired duration of the projection. A linear
extrapolation of the pace observed in the past may be acceptable in many countries, in
particular if past trends in LENS are more or less linear. This extrapolation can be based
on country-specific trends or on the average of past trends in all 16 countries.4
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3) Projection of effects of juvenile, background, and smoking mortality (J, B, and
S). Linear extrapolation of past trends in these components is unlikely to yield
satisfactory results and the analyst will have to use nonlinear methods. These are not
discussed here, but in countries where J and B have reached very low levels, holding
them constant at 2000 levels may provide a reasonable approximation.
4) Projection of life expectancy at birth, LE, by subtracting the projected values of
J, B, and S from the projected LENS for any future year:
LE = LENS – J – B – S
No attempt is made here to make complete projections for each of the four
factors—LENS , J , B , and S—that determine future trends in LE. However, it is useful to
compare existing projections of life expectancy at birth with the future trend implied by a
projection in which only the dominant component LENS is assumed to change. In this
comparison J, B, and S are held constant at levels in 2000, so that the pace of increase in
projected life expectancy in future years is the same as the past pace of increase in
senescent life expectancy without smoking.5 The resulting projections are probably
conservative because in most countries some further declines in background and juvenile
mortality are likely, and ongoing declines in smoking will bring future declines in
smoking mortality. To simplify matters further, I assume in the comparisons presented
below that the rate of increase in senescent life expectancy without smoking is equal to
the average pace for LENS for males and females in all 16 countries from 1950 to 2000
(i.e., 0.15 years per year or 7.5 years for the period 2000–2050). This implies that
increases in longevity are driven by improvements in medical technology or behavior that
will have the same impact in all countries, and any country-specific deviations from this
common trend that may occur are considered random and therefore unpredictable. This
approach is rarely used by demographers, because it disregards country- and sex-specific
past trends. It may nevertheless turn out to be as good as or better than the conventional
country- and sex-specific projections, particularly in countries whose past mortality
improvements have been much higher or lower than average. This approach ensures that
differences between countries or differences between sexes remain at 2000 levels, thus
avoiding the implausible divergence (or convergence and crossover) between countries or
sexes that can result in the long run from more conventional projections.
To illustrate, I compared life expectancy projections for females in the United
States from 2000 to 2050. Between 1950 and 2000 life expectancy rose from 71.1 to 79.5
years. As shown in Figure 9, the new projection with constant values for J, B, and S
expects female life expectancy in the United States to rise to 87.0 years in 2050 (to 81.6
for males). This result is several years lower than the optimistic Oeppen–Vaupel
projection, which gives a life expectancy of 91.6 for females in 2050 (assuming a rate of
improvement of 0.25 years per year). The main reason for this difference is that Oeppen
and Vaupel make no allowance for the future disappearance of the effect of declining
juvenile and background mortality. Figure 9 also includes the most recent projection by
the US Social Security Administration, which assumes life expectancy at birth in 2050 to
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rise to 83.2 for females and 79.4 for males (Board of Trustees OASDI 2005). This official
projection is based on complex assumptions about and extrapolations of age-, sex-, and
cause-specific death rates. The result is substantially lower longevity in the future than is
projected here with the new method. Other researchers have also concluded that the US
Social Security Administration underestimates future improvements in life expectancy
(Lee 2000; Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe 2000).6 In fact, a technical advisory panel to the
Social Security Advisory Board recommends an upward revision of these official
projections (Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods 2003). Any upward revision
would, of course, imply a higher future deficit of the US Social Security and Medicare
programs.
I prepared similar projections with constant values for J, B, and S for each of the
other 15 low-mortality countries. The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 4.
On average, female life expectancy is expected to rise from 81.5 to 89.1 years between
2000 and 2050 (from 75.8 to 83.3 years for males). The most recent UN projections for
each country are presented in the last column of Table 4. They average 87.5 for females
and 82.2 for males in 2050, which is 1.6 years lower than the new projection for females
and 1.1 years lower for males. The main reason for this difference is that the average rate
of future improvement is assumed to be 0.15 years per year while the UN assumes this
pace to converge to around 0.11 years per year by the middle of this century.7
CONCLUSION
Life expectancy has risen in the past as a result of declines in juvenile,
background, and senescent mortality. The premise of this study is that projections of life
expectancy will be more accurate if they take into account past trends in these
components and in smoking mortality. The new projection approach proposed here
removes the effects of juvenile, background, and smoking mortality from past longevity
estimates before extrapolating future trends. The removal of these factors reveals the
fundamental underlying trend in senescent life expectancy, and this trend is assumed to
be the key driver of future life expectancy trends.
The steady upward trend in senescent life expectancy in recent decades confirms
the optimists’ view that there is no evidence of approaching limits to longevity. However,
the pace of this improvement has been below the optimistic estimate of 0.25 years per
year by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002). After trends in juvenile, background, and smoking
mortality are removed, the average rate of increase in senescent life expectancy over the
past 50 years was 0.15 years per year (male–female average). Because senescent life
expectancy has increased almost linearly since 1950, it is plausible to assume that this
trend will continue for a few more decades. This implies that life expectancy is likely to
increase by an average of about 7.5 years over the next 50 years, plus any—probably
minor—effects of further declines in juvenile, background, and smoking mortality. There
is no reason to believe that advances in biotechnology, preventive and curative medicine,
and drug treatment will be less effective in reducing senescent mortality in the future than
in the past.
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The pessimists are correct in their claim that past life expectancy improvements
were largely driven by non-repeatable reductions in mortality among children and young
adults. Declines in juvenile and background mortality have indeed reached such low
levels that they can make little or no contribution to further increases in longevity. This is
one of the main reasons why life expectancy at birth rose more slowly in recent decades
than in the century before 1950. Nevertheless, declines in senescent mortality, which
were minimal before 1950, have been substantial since then, and they should result in
continuous advances in life expectancy in future decades.
The preceding analysis suggests that longevity improvements will be larger and
population aging will be more rapid than many governments of high-income countries
expect.
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APPENDIX
a) Estimation of background mortality
The conventional method for estimating background mortality involves two steps.
The first is the specification of a model for the force of mortality by age for adults. One
of the parameters in this model should be the level of background mortality, which is
assumed age invariant. For example, Gavrilov and Gavrilova (1991) use a MakehamGompertz model and Horiuchi and Wilmoth (1998), Thatcher (1999), Thatcher,
Kannisto, and Vaupel (1998), and Bongaarts (2005) use logistic models to which a
Makeham parameter for background mortality is added. The latter model can be
summarized as:

µ (a ) =

e

a

1+ e

a

+

where µ(a) denotes the force of mortality at age a. This model has three parameters: '
varies with the level of mortality, ( measures the rate of increase in mortality with age,
and ) equals background mortality.
The second step is to fit the model to the logarithm of the observed force of
mortality by age, which yields estimates for the three model parameters, including the
level of background mortality. The fitting procedure is repeated for each year and
separately for females and males for each population, yielding time series of background
mortality (t). This method has provided a good fit to empirical data for ages 25–109 with
R 2 0.999 in developed countries between 1950 and 2000 (Bongaarts 2005).
b) Estimation of senescent life expectancy
To estimate senescent mortality by age, µ S ( a, t ) , background mortality (t) is subtracted
from observed mortality rates:

µ S ( a, t ) = µ ( a, t )

( a, t )

for ages above 25 ( µ S ( a, t ) =0 for a<25). These estimates of senescent mortality by age
are then used in a life table to estimate senescent life expectancy:
x

LES (t ) = 25 + e

µ ( a ,t )
25

( t ) da

dx

25

c) Estimation of smoking effect
Let s(a, t) be the proportion of deaths attributed to smoking at age a and time t. The
senescent force of mortality in the absence of smoking µ NS (t ) is estimated from the
senescent force of mortality with smoking µ s (t ) as

µ NS ( a, t ) = (1 s( a, t )) µ S ( a, t )
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Peto et al. (2005) provides estimates of s(a,t) for males and females in most developed
countries at five-year intervals from 1950 to 2000 for three age groups: 0–34, 35–69, and
70+. These updated estimates are based on a method developed in Peto et al. (1992,
1994), which was designed to produce conservative results. If actual smoking mortality
turns out to be higher than these conservative estimates indicate, then senescent mortality
without smoking is higher and more linear than suggested in Figures 7 and 8 and Table 3.
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the exact mortality risk associated with
smoking. New studies continue to examine this issue with improved research designs
(Preston and Wang 2006; Rogers et al. 2005; Taylor et al. 2002; Thun et al. 1998).
NOTES

1

This database also provides mortality estimates for a number of Eastern Europe
countries, but they are not included in this study because this region has
experienced recent fluctuations in mortality from extraordinary social, economic,
and political changes. West Germany was also excluded because its time series
starts in 1956. Estimates for the United States before 1959 are taken from the
Berkeley Mortality Database. In a few countries, estimates for 2000 were taken
from OECD (2005) because the database information ended in 1999 or 1998.

2

The selection of age 25 as the upper age for this component ensures that juvenile
mortality includes the slightly elevated mortality observed in the late teens and
early 20s, much of which is attributable to accidents and violence.

3

The discussion here focuses on the projection of life expectancy at birth. In many
practical applications, a projection of the distribution of deaths by age is required.
Such a distribution can be obtained from model life tables, which is the procedure
used by the UN (2005). An alternative approach relies on the finding that the
distribution of senescent deaths by age retains its shape as life expectancy rises
(see Bongaarts 2005 for details).

4

The “endpoint” method for projection is used; see Wilmoth (2005) for a
discussion of advantages and disadvantages of this method.

5

This assumption implies a linear trend in life expectancy in the future. Olshansky
and Carnes (2001) and Olshansky et al. 2005 criticize projections that assume
such a linear trend. In the past, long-range trends in life expectancy in lowmortality countries have indeed not been linear, as is clear from Figure 1. White
(2002) shows that trends in recent decades have been nearly linear for both sexes
combined, but these trends will likely not continue because the contributions from
declines in juvenile and background mortality cannot be repeated. The projection
proposed here removes these confounding effects. A linear increase in life
expectancy is associated with a geometric decline in age-specific death rates if
mortality follows a Gompertz pattern (Vaupel 1986).
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6

Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe (2000) project US life expectancy for both sexes
combined to reach 82.9 years in 2050 using a variant of a method proposed by
Lee and Carter (1992). This compares to male–female averages of 84.3 years for
the new method proposed here. Projections of male–female averages of life
expectancy at birth to 2050 for six other countries by Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe
(2000) are Japan (90.91), France (87.01), Italy (86.26), Canada (85.26), Britain
(83.79), and Germany (83.12). These projections extrapolate trends within
countries and are therefore different from the projections presented here, which
assume the same future pace of improvement for all countries.

7

In United Nations projections for low-mortality countries, the pace of
improvement varies over time and converges to a fixed rate, which can vary
among countries (United Nations 2005).
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Table 1 Estimates of life expectancy at birth, life expectancy without juvenile mortality,
and senescent life expectancy: Averages for Denmark, England and Wales, Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden, 1850-2000

FEMALES

Year
1850 1900 1950 2000
52.1 72.2 80.7
66.6 75.0 81.4
73.2 76.0 81.7
14.5 2.7 0.6
6.6 1.1 0.3

Trend
18501900
6.4
2.7
1.0
-3.7
-1.8

19001950
20.1
8.3
2.8
-11.8
-5.5

19502000
8.5
6.4
5.6
-2.1
-0.8

18502000
35.0
17.5
9.4
-17.5
-8.1

Life expectancy at birth, LE
LE without juvenile mortality, LEJ
Senescent life expectancy, LES
Juvenile mortality effect, J
Background mortality effect, B

45.7
63.9
72.3
18.2
8.4

MALES
Life expectancy at birth, LE
LE without juvenile mortality, LEJ
Senescent life expectancy, LES
Juvenile mortality effect, J
Background mortality effect, B

42.6
62.0
69.5
19.4
7.5

48.9 69.1 75.8
64.6 72.8 76.8
71.2 74.0 77.6
15.7 3.6 1.0
6.6 1.2 0.8

6.3
2.6
1.7
-3.7
-0.9

20.3
8.1
2.8
-12.1
-5.4

6.7
4.0
3.5
-2.6
-0.5

33.2
14.8
8.0
-18.5
-6.7

Table 2 Senescent life expectancy, with and without smoking:
Average for 16 countries, 1950-2000

1950

2000

1950–2000

FEMALES
With smoking (LES)
Without smoking (LENS)
Smoking effect (S)

75.6
75.6
0.0

82.7
83.8
1.0

7.2
8.2
1.0

MALES
With smoking (LES)
Without smoking (LENS)
Smoking effect (S)

72.2
73.3
1.1

77.8
80.2
2.4

5.6
6.9
1.3
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Table 3 Senescent life expectancy without smoking effect, 1950 and 2000, 16 countries
Senescent life expectancy, no
Smoking effect (S)
smoking (LENS)
FEMALES
1950
2000
1950–2000
1950
2000
1950–2000
Austria
74.9
82.8
7.9
0.1
0.5
0.4
Belgium
75.1
82.8
7.7
0.0
0.5
0.5
Canada
75.6
85.1
9.5
0.0
2.1
2.1
Denmark
75.3
82.4
7.1
0.0
2.4
2.4
England & Wales
76.0
83.0
7.0
0.3
1.8
1.5
Finland
74.5
82.7
8.2
0.0
0.4
0.4
France
75.9
84.5
8.5
0.0
0.3
0.3
Italy
75.9
84.1
8.1
0.0
0.5
0.5
Japan
74.4
86.3
11.9
0.0
0.5
0.5
Netherlands
76.2
83.0
6.8
0.0
1.1
1.1
New Zealand
75.8
84.2
8.4
0.0
1.5
1.5
Norway
77.3
83.5
6.2
0.0
1.0
1.0
Spain
75.9
84.1
8.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
Sweden
75.7
83.6
7.9
0.0
0.8
0.8
Switzerland
75.4
84.4
9.0
0.0
0.5
0.5
United States
75.2
83.6
8.4
0.0
2.5
2.5
All

75.6

83.8

8.2

0.0

1.0

1.0

MALES
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
England & Wales
Finland
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United States

73.4
72.8
73.2
74.9
73.8
71.9
71.5
73.7
70.6
76.4
73.3
75.6
72.2
74.6
73.4
71.6

79.0
80.6
81.6
78.8
79.6
78.2
80.0
81.3
81.1
80.2
81.0
80.1
80.9
80.0
81.1
79.7

5.6
7.8
8.4
3.9
5.8
6.3
8.5
7.6
10.5
3.8
7.7
4.5
8.7
5.4
7.7
8.2

2.5
1.6
0.9
0.8
2.8
2.5
0.7
0.5
0.0
1.4
1.0
0.1
0.4
0.3
1.4
1.3

2.2
3.7
2.7
2.8
2.4
1.9
2.6
2.7
1.9
3.0
2.1
1.7
2.9
1.1
1.9
3.0

-0.2
2.1
1.7
2.1
-0.4
-0.7
1.9
2.2
1.9
1.7
1.1
1.6
2.5
0.8
0.6
1.6

All

73.3

80.2

6.9

1.1

2.4

1.3
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Table 4 Alternative projections of life expectancy at birth to 2050 for 16 countries
Observed (LE)
Projections to 2050
FEMALES
1950
2000
New method
UN
(constant J,B,S)
Austria
67.4
81.1
88.6
87.4
Belgium
68.9
80.9
88.5
86.9
Canada
70.6
81.9
89.4
87.9
Denmark
71.5
79.1
86.7
84.8
England & Wales
71.3
80.2
87.7
85.7
Finland
67.9
81.0
88.6
87.4
France
69.2
82.8
90.3
88.3
Italy
67.5
82.5
90.0
88.4
Japan
60.9
84.6
92.1
92.7
Netherlands
72.6
80.8
88.4
86.0
New Zealand
71.2
81.3
88.8
86.6
Norway
73.3
81.4
88.9
87.5
Spain
64.3
82.7
90.2
88.6
Sweden
72.4
82.0
89.6
87.9
Switzerland
71.1
82.6
90.2
88.6
United States
71.1
79.5
87.0
85.2
All

69.5

81.5

89.1

87.5

MALES
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
England & Wales
Finland
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United States

62.3
63.9
66.2
69.1
66.5
60.4
63.5
64.1
57.6
70.3
67.4
69.9
59.4
69.8
66.7
65.6

75.1
74.6
76.7
74.4
75.5
74.2
75.3
76.6
77.7
75.7
76.1
75.9
75.8
77.4
76.9
74.1

82.6
82.1
84.2
82.0
83.0
81.7
82.8
84.1
85.2
83.3
83.7
83.5
83.3
84.9
84.5
81.6

83.0
81.3
83.3
80.3
81.8
82.5
81.8
82.5
84.4
80.8
82.7
83.0
81.7
83.6
83.1
80.2

All

65.2

75.8

83.3

82.2
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Figure 1 Life expectancy at birth for females and males in 16 high-income
countries,
1850–2000
Figure 1: Life expectancy at birth in 16 high income countries
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Figure 3 Juvenile mortality effect on life expectancy, averages for
Denmark,
and Wales,
Netherlands,
Norway,averages
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